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Abstract 
 
 This study examines how the introduction of deposit insurance affects depositors and 
banks, using the deposit-insurance scheme introduced into the Russian banking system as a 
natural experiment. The fundamental research question is whether the introduction of deposit 
insurance leads to a more effective banking system as evidenced by increased deposit-taking and 
decreased reliance upon State-owned banks as custodians of retail deposits. We find that banks 
entering the new deposit-insurance system increase both their level of retail deposits and their 
ratios of retail deposits to total assets relative to banks that do not enter the new deposit 
insurance system. These results hold up in a multivariate panel-data analysis that controls for 
bank- and time- random effects. The longer a bank has been entered into the deposit insurance 
system, the greater is its level of deposits and its ratio of deposits to assets. Moreover, this effect 
is stronger for regional banks and for smaller banks. We also find that implementation of the new 
deposit-insurance system has the effect of “leveling the playing field” between State-owned 
banks and privately owned banks. Finally, we find strong evidence of moral hazard following 
implementation of deposit insurance in the form of increased bank risk-taking. Financial risk 
and, to a lesser degree, operating risk increase following implementation. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Academics, policymakers and others have debated the costs and benefits of explicit 
deposit insurance for almost two centuries, going back to the early 1800s when several states in 
the U.S. adopted various deposit insurance schemes to protect their state banking systems 
(Calomiris, 1994) and continuing through 1933, when the U.S. became the first country to 
provide such insurance on a national basis, until today. On the one hand, explicit deposit 
insurance reduces the likelihood and severity of bank runs during a financial crisis; on the other 
hand, explicit deposit insurance may increase the likelihood of financial crisis.  
Indeed, Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) provide evidence that explicit deposit 
insurance increases the likelihood of banking crises, especially when institutions are weak and 
interest rates are deregulated. However, they do not address potentially positive effects of deposit 
insurance; they conclude that an interesting question for future research is “whether there are 
reasons to adopt explicit deposit insurance despite its negative impact on systemic stability,” 
such as “that it may create a basis for a more developed banking system that performs more 
financial intermediation.”  
In this study, we provide new evidence that, at least in part, provides an answer to this 
question. More specifically, we examine how bankers and depositors responded to the 
introduction of explicit deposit insurance, using the deposit-insurance scheme introduced into the 
Russian banking system in 2004 as a natural experiment. The fundamental research question we 
address is whether or not deposit insurance leads to a more effective banking system as 
evidenced by increased deposit-taking and decreased reliance upon state-owned banks as 
custodians of retail deposits.  
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We also test for potential negative effects of deposit insurance in the form of increased 
risk-taking. We examine changes in financial risk, as measured by the ratio of bank capital to 
assets, and changes in operating risk, as measured by the ratio of bank loans to assets. 
The Russian experiment is an ideal laboratory for this research. Prior to 2004, there was 
no system of deposit insurance in Russia, and there were three banking crises during the previous 
16 years—in 1992, 1995, and 1998—when retail depositors suffered substantial losses. This led 
retail depositors to either rely upon State-owned banks that were explicitly protected by the 
government guarantees or to keep their savings “under their mattresses.” In addition, there are 
more than 1,000 banks in Russia, and these banks entered into the new deposit insurance system 
one-by-one at different points in time rather than all at once. 
In order to conduct this experiment, we assemble a unique new dataset on the Russian 
banking industry from a variety of publicly available Russian-language sources. Using these 
data, we contribute to the literature on deposit insurance in at least two key areas.  
First, we provide new evidence on the issue of whether or not a system of explicit deposit 
insurance leads to increased financial intermediation in the form of higher levels of deposits. Our 
results provide strong evidence that financial intermediation as measured by the level of deposits 
does increase following implementation of a deposit insurance system. 
Second, we provide new evidence on the issue of whether or not deposit insurance leads 
to reduced reliance upon State-owned banks. This second issue is at least as important as the 
first, as La Porta et al. (2002) demonstrate: government ownership of banks around the world is 
pervasive and has negative consequences for financial development and economic growth. King 
and Levine (1993) and numerous others have demonstrated the importance of financial 
development for economic growth. (See Levine (2004) for a recent survey.) We find that reliance 
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upon State-owned banks as a repository for deposits does decrease following implementation of 
an explicit deposit-insurance system, but that this result is driven by the one dominant State-
owned bank, Sberbank, which may have reduced its reliance upon retail deposits in response to 
the cost of the new deposit insurance premiums. Even so, this result suggests that 
implementation of the new deposit-insurance system had the effect of “leveling the playing 
field” between State-owned and privately owned banks. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we provide a very brief 
review of the literature on deposit insurance, highlighting papers that are most relevant to the 
research questions we address. In section 3, we provide background information on the 
implementation of deposit insurance in Russia. In section 4, we describe our unique dataset on 
Russian banks. In section 5, we present our methodology for testing our hypotheses regarding the 
effects of deposit insurance implementation on the Russian banking system. Our results appear in 
section 6, and we close with a summary and conclusions in section 7. 
 
2. Literature on the costs and benefits of deposit insurance 
There are a number of theoretical papers that explore the cost and benefits of a deposit 
insurance system; these are summarized by Kane (1995, 2000).1 In a seminal article by Diamond 
and Dybvig (1983), a system of deposit insurance ensures bank stability threatened by depositor 
runs. However, researchers universally accept that deposit insurance creates moral hazard, as 
banks can fund high-risk assets that are not reflected in their liability costs (deposit rates). The 
U.S. S&L and commercial banking crises during the 1980s and 1990s well demonstrated the 
                                                          
1
 See, for example, Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Chari and Jagannathan (1988), Kane (1995), 
Calomiris (1996), Bhattacharya et al. (1998), and Allen and Gale (1998). 
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costs of such moral hazard, as regulators spent hundreds of billions in dollars to sell or liquidate 
insolvent financial institutions. 
An even wider literature empirically analyzes the costs of deposit insurance. Most of 
these studies analyze data at the country-level rather than at the bank level. In general, these 
studies find that moral hazard is a greater problem in countries with explicit deposit insurance, 
leading to a greater likelihood of banking crises.2 
There are only two previous studies of which we are aware that analyze the potentially 
beneficial effects of deposit insurance. Cull, Senbet and Sorge (2005) examine cross-country 
data over the 1990-99 period for evidence on whether or not deposit insurance contributes to the 
development and stability of a country’s financial system. Their results suggest that deposit 
insurance has a negative impact on financial development and growth in the long run, except in 
countries with strong legal and regulatory institutions. Angkinand (2009) examines whether 
deposit insurance (and other banking regulations) can reduce the output costs of banking crises. 
Using data from 47 crises in 35 countries during 1970 – 2003, she finds that the output cost is 
lower for countries with high deposit insurance coverage. 
While there have been a number of recent articles that look at banking in transition 
economies,3 there are very few studies during the past two decades that examine bank-level data 
for evidence on the impact of deposit insurance. Duan, Moreau, and Sealey (1992) test whether 
banks shift risk to the deposit insurer. Using a sample of 30 large publicly traded U.S. banks, 
                                                          
2
 See, for example, Honohan and Klingebiel (2003); Kane and Klingebiel (2004); Demirgüç-
Kunt and Huizinga (2004); Laeven (2004); and Demirgüç-Kunt, Kane, and Laeven (2006). 
 
3
  See, for example, Berkman, Cole and Fu (2009), Brown et al. (2009); Cole, Moshirian and Wu 
(2008); Fu and Heffernan (2009); Koutsomanoli-Filippaki, Margaritis and Staikouras (2009); 
and Männasoo and Mayes (2009). 
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they find that banks are largely unsuccessful in increasing their actuarial liabilities to the deposit 
insurer.  
Mondschean and Opiela (1999) examine the impact of changes in deposit insurance on 
the market for bank time deposits in Poland. They find that, after a new law increased deposit-
insurance coverage, bank-specific variables became less important in explaining differences in 
deposit interest rates. They interpret this as evidence of decreased market discipline following 
the increase in deposit-insurance coverage.   
Laeven (2002) examines bank-level data from Bankscope and Datastream for 144 banks 
in seven emerging-market countries and seven developed countries over the period 1991-98, and 
uses the cost of deposit insurance to examine the relation between governance structures and 
bank risk-taking. He finds that the costs are highest for banks with concentrated private 
ownership and lowest for banks with dispersed ownership, indicating that risk-taking is highest 
for the former and lowest for the latter group of banks. 
Hovakimian, Kane and Laeven (2003) analyze bank-level data from Bankscope and 
Datastream for 390 banks in 56 countries over the period 1991-99 to examine how deposit 
insurance influences risk-shifting by banks—whereby banks shift risks onto the deposit insurer 
without paying adequate compensation. They find that explicit deposit insurance exacerbates 
risk-shifting, especially in countries with weak institutions. They also find that this effect is 
mitigated by loss-control features such as risk-based premiums and co-insurance. 
Gueyie, Jean-Pierre and Van Son Lai (2003) examine the impact of implementation of 
fixed-rate deposit insurance in Canada. Using data from 1959 – 1982 on five publicly traded 
banks, they find that various market-based measures of risk-taking increased, while capital ratios 
decreased, following implementation in 1967. 
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Gonzales (2005) examines how regulatory restrictions affect bank charter value and bank 
risk-taking. Using a sample of 251 banks in 36 countries, he finds that deposit insurance 
encourages banks to engage in risk-shifting, and that better country-level governance reduces the 
incentives for such risk-shifting.  He also shows that deposit insurance increases bank charter 
value.   
 
 
3. Background on the Russian experiment in deposit insurance 
In 1934, the U.S. became the first country to implement a system of deposit insurance, 
responding to banking runs following the stock market crash of 1929. During the past 75 years, 
most developed, and many developing, countries have followed suit. In 1998, the IMF 
recommended limited forms of deposit insurance as “best-international practice.” By the time of 
the Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) study, 61 countries had adopted some form of 
deposit insurance, and, as of October 2008, there were 101 countries with deposit-insurance 
systems in operation, with another 18 countries planning for such systems.4  
During autumn of 2003, the Russian Federal Assembly passed a series of six bills that 
formed the basis of a system of explicit deposit insurance for the Russian banking system. In 
December of 2003, these bills were signed into law, culminating more than a decade of efforts. 
(See Tompson (2004) for details of the six bills.) The Assembly intended for coverage to be 
quite modest, covering only physical persons to a maximum of RUB100,000 or about 
USD3,500. However, regulators expected this level of insurance to cover about 85% of all retail 
deposits in the country. As Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) point out, limited coverage is 
                                                          
4
 Source: International Association of Deposit Insurers: http://www.iadi.org 
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one important way to mitigate the moral hazard associated with deposit insurance, covering only 
those least likely to monitor bank risk-taking.  
In August 2006, the Assembly increased the coverage limit to RUB190,000, which 
equals approximately 130 percent of 2006 per capita GDP. This newly adopted amendment also 
introduced co-insurance, as the amounts above RUB100,000 are reimbursed at only a 90 percent 
rate. The Assembly introduced the coinsurance mechanism to provide incentives for large 
depositors to monitor their banks. In subsequent years, the Assembly has gradually increased the 
coverage limit further—to RUB400,000 in March 2007 and to RUB700,000 in October 2008.  
The October 2008 law amendments have also abolished the coinsurance for the amounts in 
excess of RUB100,000 and established full coverage up to RUB700,000. 5 
One of the primary goals of deposit-insurance implementation was to draw out the 
estimated USD40 billion in cash savings held by Russian citizens “under their mattresses” and 
outside of the banking system, which then could be used by banks as the basis for new loans.  
Specifically, the Law on Deposit Insurance defined three closely related goals: (i) the protection 
of depositors’ funds, (ii) the increase in the depositors’ confidence in the Russian banking system 
and (iii) the attraction of household savings in the Russian banking system. These goals arose out 
of historical experience of Russian depositors, who had been victimized by the losses suffered 
during the banking crises of 1992, 1995, and 1998, which collectively led to a loss of confidence 
in privately owned banks.  
There is also another institutional characteristic of the Russian deposit market that 
increases the banking system’s vulnerability and the importance of the deposit insurance system 
in preventing bank runs. By law, all retail deposits in Russia, including term deposits, are 
                                                          
5
 See amendments to the Federal Law “On Insurance of Household Deposits in Banks of the 
Russian Federation,” which took effect On October 14, 2008. The new parameters of the deposit 
insurance system are applicable to banks that failed after October 1, 2008. 
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revocable. Any deposit can be withdrawn by its owner at any time (Civil Code Article 837). 
Thus, all deposits in Russia are essentially demand deposits.  
Prior to the new legislation, the Russian government had explicitly stated that it would 
cover depositor losses only at State-controlled banks6, the largest of which was Sberbank. 
Largely due to its explicit coverage, Sberbank came to dominate the retail deposit market with a 
market share of 62.8% as of the end of 2003, prior to the deposit insurance system 
implementation. Sberbank represents a special case of the State-controlled banks as the Central 
Bank of Russia (“CBR”) directly participates in its capital with a 67% share. As of 2008, it was 
the largest bank in the Central and Eastern Europe. Hence, a supplementary goal of the deposit-
insurance implementation was to introduce a fair competition among all banks in the system and 
to reduce the reliance of retail depositors on Sberbank (and other State-controlled banks).  
The process for banks’ entry into the deposit-insurance system involved several stages 
and included rigorous on-site examinations.  Each bank had to apply for deposit-insurance 
coverage and then was subject to a special examination before coverage would be granted. The 
law set the deadline for the banks’ applications as the end of June 2004. Regulators approved 
applications of the first group of 26 banks in September 2004 and issued the last approvals in 
September 2005. All procedures, including appeals, were finalized by the end of 2005. As a 
result of adverse findings during the special on-site bank examinations, regulators rejected the 
applications of 191 banks, and revoked the licenses of another 24 banks. Appendix 1 summarizes 
stages of deposit insurance introduction in Russia.  
                                                          
6
  Before the introduction of the deposit-insurance system, the State-controlled banks with more 
than 50% of state ownership enjoyed full implicit insurance guaranteed by the Russian 
government. This insurance did not have any coverage limits—all household deposits in these 
banks were fully covered. 
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Federal law 177-FZ “On the Insurance of Household Deposits in Banks of the Russian 
Federation” established the Deposit Insurance Agency (“DIA”) in January 2004. The DIA 
manages the deposit insurance fund, monitors banks’ insurance premiums and organizes 
compensation payouts.  All insured banks have to pay insurance premiums on a quarterly basis, 
which the DIA initially set at a flat 0.15% rate on their average daily balances of household 
deposits during the accounting quarter.  In July 2007, the DIA reduced the insurance premium to 
0.13%.  As of the 4th quarter of 2008, The DIA reduced the premium to only 0.10%.   
By the end of the Deposit-Insurance-System (DIS) introduction in December 2006, the 
DIA register included 924 insured banks or about 80% of Russian banks.  The banks that failed 
to enter the DIS lost the right to attract new deposits. However, they retained the right to serve 
the existing deposits 7 and to apply for a new license for retail deposits’ operations and DIS 
acceptance in two years after the initial rejection. 
 
4. Data 
We use bank-level balance-sheet data to provide new evidence regarding how bankers 
and depositors respond to the introduction of deposit insurance. As shown in Table 1, the 
Russian banking industry is growing quite fast in terms of assets but remains relatively small as a 
percentage of GDP.  In 2007, the RUB20,241 billion in total assets accounted for 61.4% of GDP.   
For comparison, Barth, Caprio, and Nolle (2004) survey cross-country banking sector 
characteristics and report that the banking-system assets in countries comparable to Russia’s 
level of economic development are, on average, 91.3% of GDP.  The ratio of deposits to assets is 
also relatively low in Russia, but has grown from about 18.7% in 1999 to 25.4% in 2007. The 
                                                          
7
 By deposit-insurance law amendments, the remaining deposits of non-member banks are 
insured by the Central Bank of Russia instead of the Deposit Insurance Agency.  
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ratio of loans to assets is more typical of developed banking systems, ranging from a low of 
31.9% in 1999 to a high of 60.7% in 2007. 
The Russian banking system has been (and continues to be) dominated by Sberbank—the 
State-owned bank enjoying an explicit State guarantee of deposit insurance.  However, its 
dominance of the retail deposits market has weakened during recent years, as Sberbank’s share 
of deposits has fallen from 63.0 percent at the end of 2003 to 54.4 percent at the end of 2007 
(Figure 1).  
There is no comprehensive and publicly available source of data on the financial 
statements of Russian banks. However, we are able to construct a unique and representative 
dataset of Russian banks by combining information from three reliable local sources, none of 
which are available in English.   
The first of these sources is a set of financial reports published online by the CBR itself. 8 
A majority of Russian banks grant the CBR permission to disclose their detailed balance sheets 
and income statements on the monthly basis through the CBR website. For example, in February 
2004 (the first month for which this information is available), about 52% of all Russian banks 
disclosed their financial statements. By the end of 2006, this number had gradually risen to 
almost 70%. We decode the detailed entries of reported financial statements by relying on the 
Russian Accounting Standards for banks and the CBR official methodologies for the aggregation 
of accounts.   
We obtain monthly data on deposits, loans, assets, and liabilities of approximately 800 
Russian banks from the records of the CBR for the period Feb. 1, 2004 through Dec. 1, 2006. 
Hence, the sample period consist of 35 months and covers pre- and post-DIS introduction.  The 
                                                          
8
 See http://www.cbr.ru/credit/transparent.asp. 
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panel is unbalanced and consists of 26,076 bank-month observations. The number of unique 
banks with financial data from the CBR in at least one month is 851; 743 banks have data for at 
least 20 months and 615 banks have data for all 35 months. The number of banks that disclose 
their financial statements through the CBR website gradually increases over time: from 663 at 
the beginning of 2004 to 793 at the end of 2006. Some banks may have statements for non-
continuous months; therefore, the number of unique banks, 851, is larger. 
To distinguish among State-controlled, foreign-controlled, and privately-controlled 
domestic banks, we use information on each bank’s equity accounts. By the Russian Accounting 
Standards for banks, all equity shares must be reported by the type of owner. We define State-
controlled bank as a bank in which any combination of State entities, including various 
government authorities or government-owned companies, hold a majority ownership stake. We 
define a foreign-controlled bank as a bank in which foreign investors collectively own a majority 
stake.  In the case of Russia, a typical foreign-controlled bank is a subsidiary company of a 
foreign bank, as the Russian banking law does not allow foreign branches.   
Our second source is a weekly periodic publication of the CBR known as the Bulletins of 
the Central Bank of Russia.  This publication contains non-financial characteristics of all banks 
licensed by the CBR.  From this source we obtain information on bank legal form (open joint-
stock, closed joint-stock, or private bank), location (Moscow or regional bank), and license type 
(general license or license with restrictions). We hand-collect this information from the bulletin 
as of year-end 2005. 9  
                                                          
9
 See Вестник Банка России, Issue 2 (872), January 19, 2006. 
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Our third source is a publicly available registry of all insured banks maintained by the 
DIA.10 From this source, we obtain information on the date of each banks’ entry into the deposit-
insurance system.  
We are able to accurately match-merge information from these three data sources by 
using a unique license registration number assigned to each bank by the CBR. Each of the three 
data sources uses this registration number as a means of identifying individual banks. We 
provide a description of each variable and data source in Appendix 2. 
Our sample is broadly representative of the Russian banking system, encompassing 
approximately 60 percent of the industry by number of banks and about 96 percent of the 
industry by household deposits. (It should be noted that Sberbank, by itself, accounts for 60% of 
the industry’s household deposits and about 30% of the industry’s assets.) Our sample is even 
more representative for the banks that operate on the household-deposits market. For example, as 
of the end of 2005, only 1,045 out of 1,205 Russian banks had a license for attracting household 
deposits. By the end of 2006, the number of banks with a household-deposit license declined to 
only 924, as the banks that did not enter the deposit insurance system lost their privilege to 
attract new deposits.   
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for our financial and non-financial variables. In 
Panel A of Table 2 are descriptive statistics on financial characteristics of our sample banks. 
Average assets rise from RUB11.156 billion in February 2004 to RUB22.643 billion in 
December 2006, but these values are highly skewed by Sberbank; median assets rise from 
RUB774 million in February 2004 to RUB1.378 billion in December 2006. Similar changes are 
seen in retail deposits: the average rose from RUB2.182 billion to RUB3.739 billion while the 
                                                          
10
 See http://www.asv.org.ru/guide/bank/. 
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median rose from RUB109 million to RUB219 million. Consequently, the average and median 
ratios of retail deposits to assets remained relatively constant at 21 - 22 percent and 18 - 19 
percent, respectively. The median ratio of equity to assets dropped from 18 percent to 14 percent, 
primarily because of the increase in assets rather than a decline in equity. The mean (median) 
ratio of loans to assets increases from 41 (42) percent to 47 (49) percent during the sample 
period, with a relatively stable standard deviation of about 18 percent. 
In Panel B of Table 2 are descriptive statistics for non-financial characteristics of our 
sample banks. About 30 percent of our banks have a general license while the remaining 70 
percent hold restricted licenses. About 45 percent are organized as open-stock companies and 55 
percent as closed-stock companies. Around 39 percent are Moscow-area banks with the 
remainder classified as regional banks. By ownership, 93 percent are domestic private, 3 percent 
are State-controlled and 4 percent are foreign-controlled.  In general,  the study sample is 
representative for the structure of the Russian banking system. 
Panel B of Table 2 also reports the distribution of sample banks by the stages of DIS 
acceptance.  About 75 percent of sample banks were accepted in the first stage, 10 percent were 
accepted in the second or third stages (after the initial rejection in the first stage), and the 
remaining 15 percent had not been accepted into the DIS by the end of its introduction. 
 
5. Methodology 
 According to Allen and Santomero (1997), financial intermediation occurs when 
institutions take deposits and channel funds to firms, in other words, when they issue deposits 
and use these funds to make loans. Consequently, we focus on measures of deposit-taking and 
loan-issuance.  We track the deposits of privately held and State-owned Russian banks during the 
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period before and after passage and implementation of deposit insurance in order to test the 
following three hypotheses: 
H1: The level of deposits and ratio of deposits to assets will increase with the number of 
days that a bank has been entered into the DIS, which differs for each bank. 
H2: The market share of deposits at State-owned banks will decrease in response to the 
new explicit deposit-insurance coverage at privately-owned banks. 
H3: Operating risk (as measured by the ratio of loans to assets) and financial risk (as 
measured by the ratio of equity to assets) will increase in response to implementation of 
the DIS as a result of moral hazard.11 
To test these hypotheses, we employ information on total deposits and total assets, along 
with information on ownership sufficient to categorize privately held and State-controlled banks. 
We perform univariate tests to determine whether total deposits have increased and whether the 
market share of State-owned banks has decreased.  We also perform these tests in a multivariate 
framework using the following form:  
Y i, t = β 0 + β 1 ×State-Controlled i, t + β 2 × Days in DIS i, t + 
+ β 3 × (State-Controlled i, t × Days in DIS i, t) + β  j  × Control i, t  + ε i, t 
                                                          
11
 The literature on financial institutions is replete with a wide variety of measures of bank risk, 
including the variability of stock returns, the levels of nonperforming loans, and the z-score, 
which is a measure of insolvency risk defined as the difference in the capital-to-asset ratio and 
return on assets divided by the standard deviation of return on assets. We choose to use the loan-
to-asset ratio as our measure of operating risk because it has been widely used by regulators 
around the world, and because we face serious obstacles to using these alternative measures. 
Most Russian banks are not publicly traded, precluding the use of market measures of risk such 
as the volatility of stock returns. The z-score requires a long time-series of data for calculating 
the standard deviation of returns, which is not available for our sample of Russian banks. Finally, 
information on nonperforming loans for Russian banks is available but has been criticized 
because these data refer to the value of the delinquent payment rather than to the value of the 
underlying delinquent loans. Moreover, “evergreening” of nonperforming loans, where 
nonperforming loans are re-issued as performing loans, is alleged to be a widespread practice at 
Russian banks. 
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where: 
Y i, t  is the natural logarithm of retail deposits at bank i, the ratio of retail deposits to total 
assets at bank i, the ratio of equity to assets at bank i, or the ratio of loans to assets at 
bank i;  
State-Controlled i, t is a zero-one indicator variable for bank i during period t that is equal 
to one for State-controlled banks;  
Days in DIS i, t is the natural logarithm of the number of days that bank i has been 
accepted into the deposit insurance system as of period t, measured as  
ln (Days in DIS + 1);  
Control
 i, t = a vector of j control variables for bank i, including dummy variables 
indicating Foreign-Controlled Banks, Regional Banks, General-License Banks, Open-
Joint-Stock Banks, as well as Bank Size (as measured by the natural logarithm of total 
assets) and Leverage (as measured by the ratio of total equity to total assets); and a series 
of 34 time fixed-effects dummies for each month in our sample; and 
ε
 i, t is a random-effects error term for bank i in period t. 
We also interact some of the control variables with our deposit-insurance variable. 
Our panel dataset enables us to account for the multiple stages of the DI implementation 
in Russia and for the fact that the change in the deposit-insurance regime occurred at a different 
time for each bank. The beta coefficients indicate the percentage changes in deposits for a one 
unit change in the explanatory variables.  According to our hypotheses, we expect (β 2 > 0) and 
(β 3 < 0) for both dependent variables.  
A broad set of financial and non-financial control variables allow us to identify which 
banks in the heterogeneous Russian banking industry benefit most from the introduction of the 
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deposit-insurance system.  The bank-level variables include size, capital ratio, location, legal 
form, and license type.  To distinguish between domestic and foreign-controlled daughter banks, 
we introduce an additional dummy variable that identifies foreign-controlled banks.  
Finally, to control for expected changes in deposits unassociated with deposit-insurance 
implementation, we also add a set of 34 monthly dummies—one for each month in our sample 
period. These dummy variables allow us to account not only for the changes in the 
macroeconomic environment, such as increases in the household income, economy growth, and 
inflation, but also for the seasonality of deposits.  
To test the moral hazard hypothesis (H3), we run two separate sets of regressions using 
the bank-equity ratio and the bank-loan ratio as dependent variables that proxy for bank financial 
risk and bank operating risk-taking.  
We investigate how the introduction of the DIS affects banks’ deposit-taking by 
employing random-effects estimation.  The random-effects model allows us to estimate the 
effects of time-invariant bank characteristics—such as ownership type, license type, legal form, 
and location.  As described in the data section, our panel is unbalanced and consists of 26,076 
bank-month observations.  For in-depth analysis, we also split the study sample by four 
DIS-introduction sub-periods defined in Appendix 1, and run separate regressions.  
6. Results 
6.1. Univariate comparisons 
 
In Table 3, we document the differences in deposit levels between insured and non-
insured banks across four periods of deposit-insurance introduction, which are described in 
Appendix 1. Within each period, we average across bank-month observations. In the pre-DIS 
implementation period, all banks are non-insured.  
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During the first stage of DIS implementation, the banks gradually enter the DI system—
some banks enter the system later than others because of the time-consuming CBR examination 
procedures. During this period, membership is a positive signal while non-membership is not a 
negative signal yet.  
In the following period, (stages 2 and 3 by the DI law), a bank that was initially rejected 
has a right to appeal and can be accepted if it addressed the CBR criticism that caused rejection 
in the Stage 1. At this stage, the non-membership is a negative signal, as the bank was initially 
rejected by the CBR.  By the end of DIS introduction, each bank’s quality has been completely 
revealed to the public by its ultimate acceptance or rejection by the CBR.   
In Panel A of Table 3, we look at the level of deposits in millions of rubles. We focus our 
discussion on the medians rather than the means because of the disproportionate impact of 
Sberbank. In the pre-DIS implementation period, the median level of deposits is 120, and rises to 
135 in the first stage, 161 in the second and third stages, and peaks at 204 in the post-
implementation period. During the first stage of DIS implementation, we see the difference 
between insured and uninsured banks emerge, with the median of the former at 241 and the 
median of the latter at 91. In the second and third stages of DIS implementation, the median of 
insured banks is 212 while the median for uninsured banks is 37. Finally, after DIS 
implementation, the median for insured banks peaks at 267, while the median for uninsured 
banks falls to 4, indicating a near total withdrawal from the market for retail deposits. At each 
stage, the difference in medians is statistically significant at better than the 0.01 level. In general, 
the numbers reveal that, in each subsequent stage of the DIS implementation, the overall growth 
of deposit in Russia is accompanied with the gradual redistribution of retail deposits within the 
banking system from non-insured to insured banks.   
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In Panel B of Table 3, we look at the ratio of retail deposits to total assets. In the pre-DIS 
implementation period, the median ratio of retail deposits to total assets is 0.18. This ratio rises 
to 0.182 in the first period, to 0.189 in the second and third periods, and peaks at 0.191 in the 
post-implementation period. During the first stage of DIS implementation, we again see the 
difference between insured and uninsured banks emerge, with the median of the former at 0.28 
and the median at the latter at only 0.14. In the second and third stages of DIS implementation, 
the median of insured banks is 0.23 while the median for uninsured bank falls to only 0.06. 
Finally, after DIS implementation, the median for insured banks is 0.22, while the median for 
uninsured banks falls even farther to 0.01, again indicating a near total withdrawal from the 
market for retail deposits. 12 At each stage, the difference in medians again is statistically 
significant at better than the 0.01 level.   
In general, the results in Panel B of Table 3 for both the level of retail deposits and the 
ratio of retail deposits to total assets are broadly supportive of our hypothesis that the level of 
deposits and ratio of deposits to assets will increase at banks accepted into the DIS but will fall at 
banks rejected from the DIS. 
Table 4 reports descriptive statistics for the evolution of the level of retail deposits and 
the ratio of retail deposits to assets in the subsample of the State-controlled banks.  As described 
earlier (Panel B Table 2), there are 24 unique State-controlled banks in our sample. These are the 
banks that are majority-owned by any combination of federal or local governments. As of the 
end of 2005, the size of State-controlled banks in our sample ranges from RUB223 million of 
assets (regional bank Elita) to RUB5,316,694 (Sberbank). The median size of these banks is 
                                                          
12
 In 2006 and 2007, CBR Banking System Development Reports explain the decrease of retail 
deposits share in bank liabilities by the gradual development of alternative investment 
opportunities for the individuals, including mutual funds and “blue chip” stocks. Other potential 
explanations: (1) assets grew faster than retail deposits (see Table 1) and banks have to rely on 
other sources of financing; and (2) consumption boom in Russia. 
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RUB1,136 million, which is comparable to the median size of private banks’ assets for the same 
period.  
In the pre-DIS regime, the State-controlled banks enjoyed full government guarantees on 
their household deposits. The exclusive deposit insurance for this group of banks was granted by 
the provisions of the old Civil Code (article 840).  During the DIS introduction, these guarantees 
were revoked, as the State-controlled banks had to enter the system on the common rules.  
Sberbank, as a special case, retained the full government deposit guarantee until the end of 2006, 
but only for those deposits that were opened before the DIS introduction. Sberbank entered the 
DIS in January 2005. Overall, 22 out of 24 State-controlled banks in our sample entered the DIS 
in the 1st stage, one entered the system in the 2nd stage, and one entered the system in 2008. 
The descriptive statistics in Table 4 provides mixed results. On the one hand, there is no 
evidence of the consistent decline in the household deposits for the State-controlled banks, as 
measured by either the levels of deposits or the ratio of deposits to assets. On the other hand, 
there is a distinct downward trend in Sberbank’s ratio of deposits to assets. Because this bank 
accounts for a very large share of the country’s household deposits, the decline in Sberbank’s 
deposit-to-asset ratio results in a gradual decline in the overall market share of state-controlled 
banks.  This declining trend in Sberbank market share also is evident in Figure 1.   
One possible explanation for the observed gradual decline of Sberbank’s deposit-to-asset 
ratio during the sample period is changes in this bank’s deposit policy in response to the DIS 
introduction.  As described in the background section, the DIS insurance premium is flat and 
mandatory in Russia. Therefore, the DIS imposed new costs for a State-controlled bank, 
especially for a bank with a very high deposit-to-assets ratio (in the case of Sberbank, above 95th 
percentile) and a huge deposit portfolio.  In 2005, Sberbank paid RUB7.7 billion, or 3.2% of its 
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total expenses, as insurance premiums.  Our argument in favor of Sberbank’s choice to reduce its 
retail deposit portfolio due to its increased costs is further supported by the fact that, during the 
sample period of 35 months, Sberbank increased its deposit interest rate to compete with private 
banks only once. This happened in February 2006 and it was the first increase since August 
2003.  Therefore,  the reduction in Sberbank’s deposit ratio following the DIS introduction may 
be driven not only by the changes in the depositors’ reliance on the State banks, but also (and, 
perhaps, primarily) by the fact that the DIS eliminated an unfair competitive advantage of State 
banks in the retail deposit market and increased their costs of funding.   
6.2. Random-effects regression analysis 
 
In Tables 5 through 8, we present the results from our random-effects regressions 
analyzing the level of deposits and the ratio of retail deposits to total assets, respectively. We 
present the results of five regressions for each dependent variable: results for the full period, for 
the pre-DIS period, for the first stage of the DIS period, for the second and third stages of the 
DIS period and for the post-DIS period. In each regression, we measure each bank’s deposit-
insurance status by the (natural logarithm of) the number of days that the bank has been in the 
deposit-insurance system, for which we expect a positive and significant coefficient.   
We include a series of control variables. We include firm size as measured by the natural 
logarithm of total assets. We include dummies for a regional bank (as opposed to a Moscow 
bank), for a general banking license (as opposed to a restricted banking license) and for an open 
joint-stock company (as opposed to closed joint-stock or private company). We include month 
dummies to control for macro-economic and seasonality effects.  
We also include two interaction terms, interacting the number of days that the bank has 
been in the deposit insurance system with bank size and with the dummy indicating regional 
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banks. We expect that smaller banks and regional banks disproportionately benefited from 
implementation of the DIS so that the coefficient on the first interaction term should be negative 
and on the second term should be positive.  
Finally, in Tables 7 and 8, we control for bank risk-taking behavior by including two 
additional explanatory variables: financing risk (measured by the ratio of total equity to total 
assets) and operating risk (measured by the ratio of total loans to assets).  
In Table 5 are our results for the natural logarithm of retail deposits. Our primary 
variables of interest are the length of deposit insurance coverage and the two interactions of that 
variable with firm size and with the dummy for regional banks. We find that the length of 
deposit-insurance coverage is positive and statistically significant, strongly supportive of our 
primary hypothesis. The interaction with regional banks also is positive and statistically 
significant, indicating that this effect is more important for regional banks than for Moscow 
banks and for small banks (as revealed by the coefficients on the two interaction terms). 
In Table 6 are our results for the ratio of retail deposits to total assets. Again, our primary 
variables of interest are the length of deposit-insurance coverage and the two interactions of that 
variable with firm size and with the dummy for regional banks. We find that the length of 
deposit-insurance coverage is positive and statistically significant, strongly supportive of our 
primary hypothesis. The interaction with regional banks also is positive and statistically 
significant, indicating that this effect is more important for regional banks than for Moscow 
banks and for small banks (as revealed by the coefficients on the two interaction terms). 
To address our hypothesis on the decrease of deposits in State-controlled banks in 
response to the DIS introduction, we include interaction of State-controlled bank indicator 
variable with the logarithm of days in DIS in all multivariate tests.  Overall, the results in Tables 
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5 and 6 provide weak support for our expectation that the DIS implementation in private banks 
leads to the reduction of deposits in State-controlled banks.  Although the estimated coefficient is 
negative at some stages of DIS introduction, it is insignificant. One possible explanation for this 
result is that the adjustment of the State-controlled banks to a new deposit market regime in 
which State banks have to pay insurance premiums and to compete with private banks is a slow 
process.  As of the end of 2006, the overall consistent decline in the share of State-controlled 
banks in the Russian deposit market was driven by the declines at Sberbank.   
Finally, we control for bank risk-taking behavior.  These results are reported in Tables 7 
and 8, and are consistent with our main results in Tables 5 and 6.  
 
6.3. Does deposit insurance create incentives for greater risk-taking?   
 
 Thus far, we have examined the “bright side” of deposit insurance; we now turn to the 
“dark side” of deposit insurance: moral hazard induced by incentives for greater bank risk-
taking. We examine two alternative paths by which banks could increase risk—financial risk as 
measured by the ratio of bank equity to assets and operating risk as measured by the ratio of bank 
loans to assets. We examine the dark side both graphically in Figure 2 and statistically in Tables 
9 and 10. 
 First, we graph the ratio of bank equity to assets—our inverse measure of financial risk—
and the ratio of bank loans to assets—our measure of operating risk, in Panels B and C, 
respectively of Figure 2. We plot the median ratios for all banks and separately for banks 
accepted in Stage 1 of the DIS and for banks accepted in Stages 2 or 3 of the DIS.  
 In Panel B of Figure 2, we see that banks accepted in Stage 1 had lower-than-average 
capital ratios, whereas banks accepted in Stages 2 or 3 had higher-than-average capital ratios. 
More interesting is the time-series behavior of the Stage 2/3 banks’ capital ratio, which rises, but 
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then falls, by the end of the period, to almost the same level as that of Stage 1 banks. This 
suggests that these banks boosted their capital ratios in order to improve their chances of Stage 
2/3 acceptance, but then increased their financial risk after acceptance—consistent with the 
moral-hazard hypothesis. Stage 1 banks also increased their financial risk after acceptance, as 
evidenced by the decline in their ratio of equity to asset—also consistent with the moral-hazard 
hypothesis.  
 In Panel C of Figure 2, we see that banks accepted in Stage 1 had higher-than-median 
operating risk as measured by the loan-to-asset ratio, whereas banks accepted in Stage 2/3 had 
lower-than-median operating risk. Stage 2/3 banks rapidly increased their operating risk during 
the Stage 1 period prior to their acceptance into the DIS, which is inconsistent with the moral 
hazard hypothesis. After a slight increase at the beginning of the Stage 1 period, the loan-to-asset 
ratio of Stage 1 banks is relatively stable—also inconsistent with the moral-hazard hypothesis. 
 Together, Panels B and C of Figure 2 provide at least some evidence in favor of the 
moral-hazard hypothesis in the form of increased financial risk as evidenced by declining capital 
ratios, but not in the form of increased operating risk as measured by the loan-to-asset ratio. 
Next, we look at more rigorous econometric evidence on the moral-hazard issue. 
 In Table 9, we analyze the ratio of bank equity to assets using the same set of explanatory 
variables used to examine the deposit-to-asset ratio. Our primary variable of interest is the log of 
days in the DIS. If banks increased their financial risk, then we would expect a negative and 
significant coefficient on this explanatory variable. Moreover, we would expect that the 
coefficient on this variable would decrease (increase in magnitude) as we move through the 
stages of implementation. As shown in the first row of Table 9, this is exactly what we find. All 
coefficients are negative and statistically significant at better than the 0.01 level. For the full 
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sample, the coefficient is -0.026. When we examine the coefficients by stage of implementation, 
we see that the coefficients are -0.018 for Stage 1, -0.049 for Stages 2 and 3, and -0.108 for the 
period after implementation. In general, these results provide econometric support in favor of the 
moral-hazard hypothesis that banks increased their financial risk following acceptance into the 
DIS, consistent with the graphical evidence in Panel B of Figure 2. 
 In Table 10, we analyze the ratio of bank loans to assets using the same set of explanatory 
variables used to examine the equity-to-asset ratio and the deposit-to-asset ratio. Again, our 
primary variable of interest is the log of days in the DIS. If banks increased their operating risk, 
then we would expect a positive and significant coefficient on this explanatory variable. 
Moreover, we would expect that the coefficient on this variable would increase as we move 
through the stages of implementation. As shown in the first row of Table 10, we find limited 
evidence consistent with these expectations. Most of the coefficients are positive, but only one of 
four (that for the full sample) is statistically significant at better than the 0.05 level. For the full 
sample, the coefficient is 0.007. When we examine the coefficients by stage of implementation, 
we see that the coefficients are 0.013 for Stage 1, -0.010 for Stages 2 and 3, and 0.025 for the 
period after implementation. In general, these results provide only limited econometric support in 
favor of the moral-hazard hypothesis that banks increased their operating risk following 
acceptance into the DIS, consistent with the graphical evidence in Panel C of Figure 2. 
 
6.4 Evaluation of the “costs” and “benefits” of deposit insurance 
 One way to evaluate the relative “costs” and “benefits” from implementation of deposit 
insurance is to evaluate the standardized marginal effects of our DIS variable. This essentially 
involves comparisons of standardized regression coefficients. To facilitate the robust comparison 
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of the relative impact of the DIS introduction on banks’ deposit-taking versus risk-taking 
incentives, we transform our main dependent variables (deposit ratio to capture benefits; equity 
ratio and loan ratio to capture risk-taking) and the set of the explanatory variables so that each 
standardized variable has a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1; we then rerun the panel 
regressions. The obtained standardized coefficient estimates for the basic model specification 
reveal the following effects. 
   For the whole sample period, if we increase an average bank’s length of membership in 
the DIS, measured as Ln (Days in DIS +1), by one standard deviation, then the loans to asset 
ratio will result in only 0.10 standard deviation increase, the predicted equity ratio will decrease 
by 0.49 standard deviations, while the deposit ratio will increase by 0.37 standard deviations.  
Thus, in terms of standard units, the length of the DIS membership has the strongest relative 
effect on the decrease of the capital ratio and somewhat weaker, but pronounced positive, effect 
on the deposit ratio. The effect on the loan ratio is relatively small. Overall, it appears that the 
magnitudes of the Ln (Days in DIS + 1) coefficients in the model specifications with 
standardized equity and deposit ratios as dependent variables are not very different. It suggests 
comparable economic importance of positive and negative effects of DIS.   
 Clearly, a reasonable limitation applies. What is “stronger” – a 0.49 decrease in the 
equity to assets ratio or a 0.37 increase in the deposit to assets ratio if we think of it in real 
(practical) terms? Should 0.10 standard deviation increase in the loan-to-asset ratio add to the 
“negativity” of DIS intro? In addition, there can be a number of other positive and negative 
influences on the balance of costs and benefits that we do not address in the study and, thus, do 
not even attempt to measure.  
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6.5. Robustness checks 
 
For the robustness check, we perform the following empirical tests.  First, we use an 
alternative measure for the DIS acceptance.  We replace the log of the number of days in DIS by 
a zero-one indicator variable that is equal to zero for observations occurring before a bank 
acceptance into deposit insurance and to one for observations occurring after the acceptance.  
The results remain unchanged.  Second, we exclude Sberbank from the analyses. This also does 
not affect our results.  Third, we exclude banks that were liquidated during the sample period. 
All results are qualitatively similar to the main results in Tables 5 and 6.  Finally, we account for 
the fact that, in the last period, after the DIS implementation, the non-insured banks lost the 
privilege to attract new deposits.  To answer the question if there is any value of getting deposit 
insurance early, we run additional regression for the last sub-period for a subsample of insured 
banks only.  The results are very similar to estimation results for Model 5 in Tables 5 and 6.   
 
7. Conclusions 
In this study, we use a natural experiment to provide new evidence on the benefits to 
depositors and banks from implementation of a system for insuring deposits. In 2004, Russia 
implemented a new system for insuring the funds of depositors. We test whether implementation 
of this system benefited depositors and banks in the form of increased deposit-taking and 
reduced reliance upon State-owned banks. We also test whether implementation of this system 
resulted in moral hazard in the form of increased risk-taking. 
We find that banks entering the new deposit-insurance system increased both their level 
of retail deposits and their ratios of retail deposits to total assets relative to banks that did not 
enter the new deposit-insurance system.  We find that these results hold up in a multivariate 
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panel-data analysis that controls for bank and time random effects in addition to a number of 
control variables. We also find that the longer a bank was entered into the deposit-insurance 
system, the greater was both its level of retail deposits and its ratio of retail deposits to assets. 
Moreover, this effect was stronger for regional banks and for smaller banks, which we expect to 
disproportionately benefit from the implementation of deposit insurance at the expense of their 
Moscow-based and larger rivals.   
Our results regarding State-owned banks are less straightforward. We find that deposits 
and the ratio of deposits to assets declined at State-owned banks following introduction of 
deposit insurance. However, this result was driven entirely by declines at Sberbank, which 
dominates the market, and there are competitive reasons why Sberbank may have voluntarily 
chosen to reduce its retail deposits in response to the new deposit insurance premiums.  Even so, 
this result suggests that implementation of the new deposit-insurance system had the effect of 
“leveling the playing field” between State-owned banks and privately owned banks. 
Finally, we find strong evidence that implementation of deposit insurance increased 
moral hazard in the form of increased risk-taking. We find that financial risk, as measured by the 
ratio of bank equity to assets, increased significantly, i.e., the ratio equity to assets declined, 
following implementation. We also find limited evidence that operating risk, as measured by the 
ratio of bank loans to assets, increased, i.e., the ratio of loans to assets increased, following 
implementation. Together with our results regarding retail deposits, these results are supportive 
of both a dark side and a bright side of deposit insurance. 
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Appendix 1 
Timeline for the Introduction of a Deposit Insurance System in Russia. 
 
 Period Overview  Sample months 
 
1 
 
Pre-DI 
 
Dec 2003: Adoption of  the Russian Deposit Insurance law  
 
Jan 2004: Creation of the Russian Deposit Insurance Agency  
 
Jun 2004:  The deadline for banks’ applications for the DIS 
acceptance.  
The number of applied banks is 1140. 
 
The Central Bank of Russia starts on-site banks’ 
examinations. 
 
 
02/01/04 – 09/01/04 
2 1st stage Sep 2004: The CBR starts issuing acceptance decisions.  
 
Mar 2005: The end of the 1st stage of DIS acceptance—all 
applied banks receive acceptance or rejection decision.  
The number of accepted banks is 824. 
 
10/01/04 – 03/01/05 
3 2nd and 3rd 
stages 
Apr – Sep 2005 (Stage 2):  Some rejected banks exercise their 
right to address the CBR criticism and to file the second 
application for the DIS acceptance.   
The number of banks which filed the second application is 
265. 
The number of banks accepted in DIS in Stage 2 is 92. 
 
Oct – Dec 2005 (Stage 3): Banks, rejected in Stage 2 can file 
two appeals.  
The number of banks which filed appeals is 142. 
The number of banks accepted in DIS in Stage 3 is 5. 
 
04/01/05 – 12/01/05 
4 After DI By the end of 2005, CBR finalizes all DIS acceptance 
procedures in accordance with the Russian DIS Law. The DIS 
introduction in Russia is completed.  
The total number of accepted banks is 924 or about 80% of all 
Russian banks. 
01/01/06 – 12/01/06 
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Appendix 2 
Variable Definitions and Sources. 
 
Variables Definition  Source 
 
1. Financial  
 
 
Russian banks’ monthly balance sheet data reported to 
CBR (Form 101) 
 
Households’  
deposits 
 
 
 
Demand deposits, term deposits, 
and payment cards accounts held by 
resident and nonresident individuals 
in rubles and foreign currency  
 
Deposits are aggregated from the following bank 
accounts by the Russian Bank Accounting Standards:  
(42301; 42302; 42303; 42304; 42305; 42306; 42307; 
42309; 42310; 42311; 42312; 42313; 42314; 42315; 
42601; 42602; 42603; 42604; 42605; 42606; 42607; 
42609; 42610; 42611; 42612; 42613; 42614; 42615) 
 
Bank size  
 
 
 
Natural logarithm of bank assets  
 
Bank assets are calculated based on the CBR 
methodology “101-I” by subtracting from the gross 
book assets the balances on the following accounts:  
(105**, 20319, 20320, 30208, 30302, 30304, 30306, 
325**, 40111, 40311, 459**, 50112, 50610, 50905, 
61406, 61408, 702**, 704**, 705**)  
 
Deposit ratio  
 
Ratio of household deposits to bank 
assets 
 
See above definitions for deposits and assets 
 
Equity ratio 
 
 
 
Ratio of book equity to bank assets 
 
Book equity is calculated through the aggregation of 
the following accounts by the Russian Bank 
Accounting Standards:   
102(01-06); 103(01-06); 104(01-06); -105(01,02); 
106(01-04); 107(01-04); 701(01-07); -702(01-09); 
703(01,02); -704(01,02); -705(01,02) 
 
Loan ratio 
 
 
Ratio of bank loans to businesses, 
households, and government 
entities to bank assets 
Bank loans are calculated through the aggregation of 
the following Asset side accounts by the Russian Bank 
Accounting Standards:   
441** to 458**; 460** to 473** 
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Appendix 2 (cont.) 
Variable Definitions and Sources. 
 
  
Variables Definition  Source 
 
2. Non-Financial 
 
 
 
 
DIS member 
 
 
Dummy variable equal to one if a 
bank is a DIS member in a given 
month and equal to zero otherwise  
 
Deposit Insurance Agency register 
 
Days in DIS 
 
Natural logarithm of one plus the 
number of  days a bank is insured 
 
Deposit Insurance Agency register 
 
General license 
bank 
 
 
 
 
Dummy variable equal to one if a 
banks holds a general license (a 
license without any restrictions on 
the legitimate banking operations) 
and equal to zero otherwise (a 
restricted license, such as 
operations in rubles only)  
 
CBR Bulletin of Banking Statistics  
 
Open joint-stock 
bank 
 
 
 
Dummy variable equal to one if a 
banks is in legal for of the open 
joint-stock company (OAO) and 
equal to zero otherwise (private 
bank: ZAO or OOO legal form) 
  
CBR Bulletin of Banking Statistics  
 
Regional bank 
 
 
 
Dummy variable equal to one if a 
bank is headquartered outside 
Moscow or Moscow region and 
equal to zero otherwise 
 
 
CBR Bulletin of Banking Statistics  
State-controlled 
bank 
 
Dummy variable equal to one if  
government entities own more than 
50% of bank voting equity and 
equal to zero otherwise  
Equity accounts by the Russian Accounting Standards:  
(10201 + 10202 + 10203) for joint stock banks  or 
(10401 + 10402 +10403) for private banks  
 
Foreign-
controlled bank 
 
Dummy variable equal to one if  
foreign investors own more than 50 
% of bank equity and equal to zero 
otherwise  
 
Equity accounts by the Russian Accounting Standards: 
10206 for joint stock banks  or 10406 for private banks 
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Fig.1. Deposit market growth (billion of RUB) and Sberbank deposit market share (%): 
2004 – 2007. 
Source: Russian Deposit Insurance Agency, 2007 annual report. 
 
 - 35 - 
  
 
A. Deposit-to-Asset Ratios (Medians) 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Evolution of the deposit, loan, and capital ratios around the DIS introduction in Russia: 
2004-2007. 
The graphs show three-month moving averages for deposit to assets,  equity to assets, and loans 
to assets median ratios for all sample banks and for two subsamples of accepted banks: banks 
accepted in the 1st stage (from September 2004 to March 2005) and banks accepted in later, 2nd 
or 3rd stages (from March to December 2005).  
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B. Equity-to-Assets Ratios (Medians) 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2 (cont.) Evolution of the deposit, loan, and capital ratios around the DIS introduction in 
Russia: 2004-2007. 
The graphs show three-month moving averages for deposit to assets,  equity to assets, and loans 
to assets median ratios for all sample banks and for two subsamples of accepted banks: banks 
accepted in the 1st stage (from September 2004 to March 2005) and banks accepted in later, 2nd 
or 3rd stages (from March to December 2005).  
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C. Loan-to-Asset Ratios (Medians) 
 
 
 
Fig. 2 (cont.) Evolution of the deposit, loan, and capital ratios around the DIS introduction in 
Russia: 2004-2007. 
The graphs show three-month moving averages for deposit to assets,  equity to assets, and loans 
to assets median ratios for all sample banks and for two subsamples of accepted banks: banks 
accepted in the 1st stage (from September 2004 to March 2005) and banks accepted in later, 2nd 
or 3rd stages (from March to December 2005).  
 - 38 - 
Table 1 
Evolution of the Russian banking system: Macro indicators, 1999 – 2007. 
 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
         
No. of banks   1,349 1,311 1,319 1,328 1,278 1,249 1,205 1,143 1,092
 
Assets 1,586 2,363 3,160 4,145 5,601 7,137 9,750 14,046 20,241
   % of GDP  32.9 32.3 35.3 38.3 42.3 42.1 45.1 52.4 61.4
 
Capital 168 286 454 581 815 947 1,242 1,693 2,672
   % of GDP  3.5 3.9 5.1 5.4 6.2 5.6 5.7 6.3 8.1
   % to Assets 10.6 12.1 14.4 14.0 14.6 13.3 12.7 12.1 13.2
 
Loans to firms 507 847 1,324 1,796 2,685 3,888 5,454 8,031 12,288
   % of GDP  10.5 11.6 14.8 16.6 20.3 22.9 25.3 29.9 37.3
   % to Assets 31.9 35.9 41.9 43.3 47.9 54.5 55.9 57.2 60.7
 
Household 
deposits 297 446 678 1,030 1,518 1,977 2,755 3,794 5,137
   % of GDP  6.2 6.1 7.6 9.5 11.5 11.7 12.8 14.3 15.6
   % to Assets 18.7 18.9 21.5 24.8 27.1 27.7 28.3 27.0 25.4
(Amounts in Billions of Russian Rubles) 
Source: “Bulletin of Banking Statistics,” Central Bank of Russia, selected issues (2002 – 2008) 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics on sample banks’ characteristics. 
 
Panel A. Continuous bank characteristics (January 2004 – November 2006,  four periods) 
 02.01.2004 01.01.2005 01.01.2006 12.01.2006 
 
Number of sample banks 663 735 769 793 
Days in DIS     
  Mean 0 21 303 594 
  Median  0 0 346 680 
  Std. Dev. 0 31 144 238 
Assets (RUB million)     
  Mean 11,156 12,641 16,881 22,643 
  Median  774 852 1,125 1,378 
  Std. Dev. 139,057 155,986 197,984 251,843 
Retail deposits (RUB million)     
  Mean 2,182 2,527 3,080 3,739 
  Median  109 138 189 219 
  Std. Dev. 38,118 43,787 50,728 62,900 
Retail deposit to assets ratio     
  Mean 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.22 
  Median  0.18 0.18 0.18 0.19 
  Std. Dev. 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.18 
Loans to assets ratio     
  Mean 0.41 0.46 0.47 0.47 
  Median  0.42 0.48 0.48 0.49 
  Std. Dev. 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.18 
Book equity to assets ratio     
  Mean 0.22 0.22 0.20 0.19 
  Median  0.18 0.18 0.15 0.14 
  Std. Dev. 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.14 
 
Panel B. Discrete bank characteristics 
 No. of banks % of sample banks 
   
DIS acceptance   
  Banks accepted in the 1st stage 638 75.0 
  Banks accepted in the 2nd or 3rd stages 85 10.0 
  Not accepted by the end of DIS introduction 128 15.0 
License type   
  General license 243 28.6 
  License with restrictions  608 71.4 
Legal form   
  Open joint stock banks  376 55.8 
  Closed joint stock and private banks 475 44.2 
Location   
  Regional banks 523 61.5 
  Moscow banks 328 38.5 
Ownership type   
  Privately-controlled banks 792 93.1 
  State-controlled banks 24 2.8 
  Foreign-controlled banks 35 4.1 
 
Total unique sample banks 851 100.0 
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Table 3 
Non-parametric comparison of insured and uninsured banks. 
 
Panel A. Distribution of observations by sample periods. 
  
Bank-month observations 
Banks not in DIS Banks in DIS All banks DI stage 
No.  %  No.  %  No.  %  
 
Pre-DI 5,538 100.0 0 0.0 5,538 100.0 
1st stage 2,829 64.2 1,579 35.8 4,408 100.0 
2-3rd stages 1,277 18.7 5,570 81.3 6,847 100.0 
After DI 1,116 12.0 8,167 88.0 9,283 100.0 
 
Total sample 10,760 41.3 15,316 58.7 26,076 100.0 
 
Panel B. Comparison of retail deposits levels in insured and uninsured banks. 
 
 
Levels of Deposits (RUB millions) 
 
All banks Banks not in DIS Banks in DIS 
DI stage 
Median Mean SE Median Mean SE Median Mean SE 
Difference 
between banks 
not in DIS and 
banks in DIS,   
p-values 
(Medians) 
 
Pre-DI 120 2,299 539 120 2,299 539 - -  - 
1st stage 135 2,463 649 91 2,297 812 241 2,761 1,079 0.00 
2-3rd stages 161 2,802 570 37 147 8 212 3,411 700 0.00 
After DI 204 3,395 587 4 84 9 267 3,847 667 0.00 
 
Total sample 160 2,849 302 80 1,813 350 245 3,576 451 
 
0.00 
 
Panel C. Comparison of retail deposits to assets ratio in insured and uninsured banks. 
 
 
Ratio of Retail Deposit to Assets 
 
All banks Banks not in DIS Banks in DIS 
DI stage 
Median Mean SE Median Mean SE Median Mean SE 
Difference 
between banks 
not in DIS and 
banks in DIS,   
p-values 
(Medians) 
 
Pre-DI 0.181 0.213 0.002 0.181 0.213 0.002 - - - - 
1st stage 0.182 0.220 0.003 0.142 0.184 0.003 0.277 0.286 0.004 0.00 
2-3rd stages 0.189 0.229 0.002 0.061 0.103 0.004 0.228 0.258 0.002 0.00 
After DI 0.191 0.226 0.002 0.010 0.044 0.002 0.224 0.251 0.002 0.00 
 
Total sample 0.187 0.223 0.001 0.134 0.175 0.002 0.230 0.257 0.001 
 
0.00 
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Table 4 
Descriptive statistics for deposit-taking by State-controlled banks. 
 
All State-controlled banks 
(N = 24 unique banks) 
Sberbank 
Deposits 
(RUB millions) 
Deposit to  
Assets Ratio 
DI stage 
Median Mean SE Median Mean SE 
Deposits 
(RUB 
millions) 
Deposit to 
Assets 
Ratio 
 
Pre-DI 108 51,311 16,458 0.146 0.201 0.011 1,052,658 0.612 
         
1st stage 137 58,995 21,637 0.161 0.207 0.013 1,165,168 0.589 
         
2-3rd stages 201 68,462 20,292 0.194 0.227 0.012 1,296,199 0.559 
         
After DI 253 87,242 23,296 0.216 0.230 0.011 1,563,774 0.517 
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Table 5 
Effects of the introduction of deposit insurance on the levels of deposits in Russian banks. 
 
Full sample Pre-DI 1st stage 2
nd
 and 3rd  
stages After DI  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Log (Days in DIS) 0.29***  0.08* 0.40*** 0.77*** 
 (0.02)  (0.04) (0.07) (0.11) 
State-controlled bank 0.09 0.07 0.16 -0.01 1.27 
 (0.13) (0.21) (0.23) (0.42) (0.86) 
State-contr. x Log (Days in DIS) 0.01  -0.02 0.02 -0.20 
 (0.01)  (0.02) (0.06) (0.13) 
Foreign-controlled bank -0.13 -0.35 -0.41 -0.90*** -0.37**  
 (0.08) (0.23) (0.25) (0.19) (0.12) 
Regional bank 1.69*** 1.11*** 1.15*** 0.61*** -1.33*** 
 (0.14) (0.17) (0.16) (0.16) (0.25) 
Regional x Log (Days in DIS) -0.01**  (0.00) 0.13*** 0.22*** 
 (0.00)  (0.01 (0.02) (0.04) 
General license bank 0.71*** 1.25*** 1.27*** 0.98*** 0.35*   
 (0.15) (0.18) (0.17) (0.16) (0.16) 
Open joint stock bank 0.45*** 0.68*** 0.58*** 0.42** 0.57*** 
 (0.13) (0.16) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) 
Bank size 1.13*** 0.77*** 0.77*** 0.94*** 0.53*** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) 
Bank size x Log (Days in DIS) -0.01***  -0.00* -0.02*** 0.02**  
 (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Intercept -5.87*** -0.73 -0.53 -3.27*** -1.50*   
 (0.23) (0.45) (0.44) (0.48) (0.64) 
 
Time dummies (months) 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Number of observations 26,076 5,538 4,408 6,847 9,283 
Number of banks 851 719 756 785 827 
Adjusted R-square 0.60 0.56 0.57 0.61 0.56 
p-value, chi-sq test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
This table presents the results from a series of random-effects regressions on an unbalanced 
panel of Russian banks. The dependent variable is the logarithm of deposits (in thousands of 
Russian rubles) and the explanatory variables are defined in Appendix 2. The sample consists of 
26,076 monthly observations of Russian banks over the period 02/01/2004 – 12/1/2006. In 
column (2) are the results for the full sample, while, in columns (3) through (6), are results for 
sub-samples by deposit-insurance introduction periods (defined in Appendix 1). All regressions 
include a set of month dummies (max 34 for full sample). Standard errors appear in parentheses 
below coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 
levels, respectively. 
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Table 6 
Effects of the introduction of deposit insurance on the deposit ratio of Russian banks. 
 
Full sample Pre-DI 1st stage 2
nd
 and 3rd  
stages After DI  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Log (Days in DIS) 0.023***  0.006* 0.040*** 0.032*** 
 (0.001)  (0.003) (0.006) (0.008) 
State-controlled bank 0.009 0.001 0.006 -0.071* -0.032 
 (0.010) (0.015) (0.019) (0.034) (0.062) 
State-contr. x Log (Days in DIS) 0.004***  0.000 0.013* 0.005 
 (0.001)  (0.002) (0.005) (0.010) 
Foreign-controlled bank -0.035*** -0.012 -0.007 -0.065*** -0.011 
 (0.006) (0.016) (0.020) (0.015) (0.008) 
Regional bank 0.159*** 0.133*** 0.140*** 0.142*** 0.025 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.018) 
Regional x Log (Days in DIS) 0.002***  0.004*** 0.002 0.017*** 
 (0.000)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
General license bank 0.004 0.062*** 0.059*** 0.046*** 0.039** 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) 
Open joint stock bank 0.017 0.041*** 0.035** 0.030** 0.036*** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) 
Bank size 0.013*** -0.015*** -0.013*** -0.001 -0.018*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Bank size x Log (Days in DIS) -0.001***  -0.003*** -0.001 0.000 
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Intercept -0.093*** 0.287*** 0.264*** 0.109** 0.256*** 
 (0.018) (0.033) (0.035) (0.039) (0.047) 
 
Time dummies (months) 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Number of observations 26,076 5,538 4,408 6,847 9,283 
Number of banks 851 719 756 785 827 
Adjusted R-square 0.28 0.15 0.18 0.23 0.27 
p-value, chi-sq test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
This table presents the results from a series of random-effects regressions on an unbalanced 
panel of Russian banks. The dependent variable is the ratio of deposits to assets and the 
explanatory variables are defined in Appendix 2. The sample consists of 26,076 monthly 
observations of Russian banks over the period 02/01/2004 – 12/1/2006. In column (2) are the 
results for the full sample, while, in columns (3) through (6), are results for sub-samples by 
deposit-insurance introduction periods (defined in Appendix 1). All regressions include a set of 
month dummies (max 34 for full sample). Standard errors appear in parentheses below 
coefficients.  *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 7 
Effects of the introduction of deposit insurance on the levels of deposits in Russian banks: 
Controlling for risk factors. 
 
Full sample Pre-DI 1st stage 2
nd
 and 3rd  
stages After DI  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Log (Days in DIS) 0.23***  0.06 0.37*** 0.64*** 
 (0.02)  (0.04) (0.07) (0.11) 
State-controlled bank 0.11 0.07 0.16 0.12 1.50 
 (0.13) (0.21) (0.23) (0.41) (0.85) 
State-control x  
Log (Days in DIS) 0.01  -0.01 0.01 -0.22 
 (0.01)  (0.02) (0.06) (0.13) 
Foreign-controlled bank 0.05 -0.29 -0.44 -0.65*** -0.32**  
 (0.08) (0.22) (0.25) (0.18) (0.12) 
Regional bank 1.21*** 0.72*** 1.07*** 0.39* -1.30*** 
 (0.13) (0.16) (0.15) (0.16) (0.25) 
Regional x Log (Days in DIS) 0.00  0.00 0.12*** 0.20*** 
 (0.00)  (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) 
General license bank 1.05*** 1.48*** 1.13*** 1.03*** 0.39*   
 (0.14) (0.18) (0.17) (0.15) (0.16) 
Open joint stock bank 0.62*** 0.80*** 0.54*** 0.47*** 0.60*** 
 (0.13) (0.15) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) 
Bank size 0.87*** 0.57*** 0.81*** 0.86*** 0.46*** 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
Bank size x Log (Days in DIS) -0.01***  0.00 -0.02*** 0.03*** 
 (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Equity to assets ratio -2.06*** -1.85*** -0.49** -1.30*** -0.89*** 
 (0.08) (0.16) (0.15) (0.14) (0.12) 
Loans to assets ratio 1.23*** 0.89*** 1.07*** 1.44*** 0.95*** 
 (0.05) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.08) 
Intercept -2.32*** 2.14*** -1.47** -2.40*** -0.98 
 (0.28) (0.56) (0.54) (0.55) (0.71) 
 
Time dummies (months) 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Number of observations 26,076 5,538 4,408 6,847 9,283 
Number of banks 851 719 756 785 827 
Adjusted R-square 0.62 0.58 0.60 0.64 0.58 
p-value, chi-sq test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
This table presents the results from a series of random-effects regressions on an unbalanced 
panel of Russian banks. The dependent variable is the logarithm of deposits (in thousands of 
Russian rubles) and the explanatory variables are defined in Appendix 2. The sample consists of 
26,076 monthly observations of Russian banks over the period 02/01/2004 – 12/1/2006. In 
column (2) are the results for the full sample, while, in columns (3) through (6), are results for 
sub-samples by deposit-insurance introduction periods (defined in Appendix 1). All regressions 
include a set of month dummies (max 34 for full sample). Standard errors appear in parentheses 
below coefficients.  *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 
levels, respectively. 
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Table 8 
Effects of the introduction of deposit insurance on the deposit ratio of Russian banks:  
Controlling for risk factors. 
 
Full sample Pre-DI 1st stage 2
nd
 and 3rd  
stages After DI  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Log (Days in DIS) 0.018***  0.004 0.035*** 0.011 
 (0.001)  (0.003) (0.006) (0.007) 
State-controlled bank 0.012 -0.002 0.005 -0.056 -0.002 
 (0.010) (0.015) (0.018) (0.032) (0.060) 
State-control. x  
Log (Days in DIS) 0.004***  0.000 0.011* 0.002 
 (0.001)  (0.002) (0.005) (0.009) 
Foreign-controlled bank -0.017** -0.005 -0.008 -0.034* -0.003 
 (0.006) (0.016) (0.020) (0.015) (0.008) 
Regional bank 0.120*** 0.111*** 0.131*** 0.115*** 0.013 
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.017) 
Regional x Log (Days in DIS) 0.003***  0.004*** 0.002 0.016*** 
 (0.000)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
General license bank 0.026** 0.070*** 0.049*** 0.052*** 0.048*** 
 (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) 
Open joint stock bank 0.029** 0.046*** 0.032** 0.036*** 0.043*** 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) 
Bank size -0.004** -0.024*** -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.034*** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Bank size x Log (Days in DIS) -0.001***  -0.002*** 0.001 0.030*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Equity to assets ratio -0.150*** -0.101*** -0.051*** -0.156*** -0.145*** 
 (0.006) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.008) 
Loans to assets ratio 0.146*** 0.082*** 0.095*** 0.159*** 0.105*** 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) 
Intercept 0.132*** 0.398*** 0.208*** 0.225*** 0.479*** 
 (0.021) (0.040) (0.042) (0.043) (0.050) 
 
Time dummies (months) 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Number of observations 26,076 5,538 4,408 6,847 9,283 
Number of banks 851 719 756 785 827 
Adjusted R-square 0.36 0.19 0.25 0.32 0.34 
p-value, chi-sq test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
This table presents the results from a series of random-effects regressions on an unbalanced 
panel of Russian banks. The dependent variable is the ratio of deposits to assets and the 
explanatory variables are defined in Appendix 2. The sample consists of 26,076 monthly 
observations of Russian banks over the period 02/01/2004 – 12/1/2006. In column (2) are the 
results for the full sample, while, in columns (3) through (6), are results for sub-samples by 
deposit-insurance introduction periods (defined in Appendix 1). All regressions include a set of 
month dummies (max 34 for full sample). Standard errors appear in parentheses below 
coefficients.  *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 9 
Effects of the introduction of deposit insurance on the capital ratio of Russian banks. 
 
Full sample Pre-DI 1st stage 2
nd
 and 3rd  
stages After DI  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Log (Days in DIS) -0.026***  -0.018*** -0.049*** -0.108*** 
 (0.001)  (0.004) (0.006) (0.009) 
State-controlled bank -0.009 0.027 0.044* 0.075* 0.148*   
 (0.010) (0.017) (0.022) (0.033) (0.070) 
State-control x  
Log (Days in DIS) 0.001  -0.001 -0.006 -0.014 
 (0.001)  (0.002) (0.005) (0.011) 
Foreign-controlled bank 0.054*** 0.009 0.021 0.073*** 0.054*** 
 (0.006) (0.019) (0.024) (0.015) (0.010) 
Regional bank -0.183*** -0.185*** -0.170*** -0.153*** -0.143*** 
 (0.008) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.019) 
Regional x Log (Days in DIS) 0.006***  0.003* 0.006*** 0.001 
 (0.000)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
General license bank 0.178*** 0.173*** 0.143*** 0.113*** 0.140*** 
 (0.009) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) 
Open joint stock bank 0.079*** 0.077*** 0.067*** 0.054*** 0.069*** 
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009 (0.009) 
Bank size -0.129*** -0.128*** -0.115*** -0.109*** -0.150*** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Bank size x Log (Days in DIS) 0.002***  0.001*** 0.003*** 0.008*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Intercept 1.987*** 1.986*** 1.833*** 1.755*** 2.307*** 
 (0.017) (0.035) (0.039) (0.038) (0.053) 
 
Time dummies (months) 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Number of observations 26,076 5,538 4,408 6,847 9,283 
Number of banks 851 719 756 785 827 
Adjusted R-square 0.27 0.29 0.27 0.29 0.28 
p-value, chi-sq test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
This table presents the results from a series of random-effects regressions on an unbalanced 
panel of Russian banks. The dependent variable is the ratio of bank capital to assets and the 
explanatory variables are defined in Appendix 2. The sample consists of 26,076 monthly 
observations of Russian banks over the period 02/01/2004 – 12/1/2006. In column (2) are the 
results for the full sample, while, in columns (3) through (6), are results for sub-samples by 
deposit-insurance introduction periods (defined in Appendix 1). All regressions include a set of 
month dummies (max 34 for full sample). Standard errors appear in parentheses below 
coefficients.  *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 10 
Effects of the introduction of deposit insurance on the loan-to-asset ratio of Russian banks. 
 
Full sample Pre-DI 1st stage 2
nd
 and 3rd  
stages After DI  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Log (Days in DIS) 0.007**  0.013* -0.010 0.025 
 (0.002)  (0.006) (0.009) (0.013) 
State-controlled bank -0.036* 0.028 0.018 -0.023 -0.124 
 (0.015) (0.026) (0.031) (0.049) (0.103) 
State-control x  
Log (Days in DIS) 0.001  -0.003 0.003 0.019 
 (0.001)  (0.003) (0.008) (0.016) 
Foreign-controlled bank -0.063*** -0.073* -0.015 -0.108*** -0.012 
 (0.010) (0.029) (0.033) (0.022) (0.015) 
Regional bank 0.078*** 0.076*** 0.063*** 0.023 -0.076**  
 (0.011) (0.014) (0.015) (0.017) (0.027) 
Regional x Log (Days in DIS) 0.001  0.001 0.009*** 0.014**  
 (0.001)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) 
General license bank 0.028* 0.048** 0.072*** 0.048** 0.086*** 
 (0.012) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) 
Open joint stock bank 0.000 0.003 0.021 0.005 0.030*   
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) 
Bank size -0.010*** -0.020*** -0.031*** -0.029*** -0.056*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) 
Bank size x Log (Days in DIS) 0.000  -0.001* 0.001 0.000 
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Intercept 0.499*** 0.621*** 0.805*** 0.793*** 1.083*** 
 (0.025) (0.048) (0.052) (0.055) (0.078) 
Time dummies (months)  
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Number of observations 26,076 5,538 4,408 6,847 9,283 
Number of banks 851 719 756 785 827 
Adjusted R-square 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.02 
p-value, chi-sq test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
This table presents the results from a series of random-effects regressions on an unbalanced 
panel of Russian banks. The dependent variable is the ratio of bank loans to assets and the 
explanatory variables are defined in Appendix 2. The sample consists of 26,076 monthly 
observations of Russian banks over the period 02/01/2004 – 12/1/2006. In column (2) are the 
results for the full sample, while, in columns (3) through (6), are results for sub-samples by 
deposit-insurance introduction periods (defined in Appendix 1). All regressions include a set of 
month dummies (max 34 for full sample). Standard errors appear in parentheses below 
coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, 
respectively. 
 
 
